

X Copy

The Director of Central Intelligence

6 MAY 1977

IC 77-2476

25X1A

2

SUBJECT

2

25X1B

25X1B

25X1A

[illegible]

File AFMCA

CLASSIFIED BY 486654
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 CATEGORY:
§ 1.5(a)(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), (19), (20), (21), (22), (23), (24), (25), (26), (27), (28), (29), (30), (31), (32), (33), (34), (35), (36), (37), (38), (39), (40), (41), (42), (43), (44), (45), (46), (47), (48), (49), (50), (51), (52), (53), (54), (55), (56), (57), (58), (59), (60), (61), (62), (63), (64), (65), (66), (67), (68), (69), (70), (71), (72), (73), (74), (75), (76), (77), (78), (79), (80), (81), (82), (83), (84), (85), (86), (87), (88), (89), (90), (91), (92), (93), (94), (95), (96), (97), (98), (99), (100), (101), (102), (103), (104), (105), (106), (107), (108), (109), (110), (111), (112), (113), (114), (115), (116), (117), (118), (119), (120), (121), (122), (123), (124), (125), (126), (127), (128), (129), (130), (131), (132), (133), (134), (135), (136), (137), (138), (139), (140), (141), (142), (143), (144), (145), (146), (147), (148), (149), (150), (151), (152), (153), (154), (155), (156), (157), (158), (159), (160), (161), (162), (163), (164), (165), (166), (167), (168), (169), (170), (171), (172), (173), (174), (175), (176), (177), (178), (179), (180), (181), (182), (183), (184), (185), (186), (187), (188), (189), (190), (191), (192), (193), (194), (195), (196), (197), (198), (199), (200), (201), (202), (203), (204), (205), (206), (207), (208), (209), (210), (211), (212), (213), (214), (215), (216), (217), (218), (219), (220), (221), (222), (223), (224), (225), (226), (227), (228), (229), (230), (231), (232), (233), (234), (235), (236), (237), (238), (239), (240), (241), (242), (243), (244), (245), (246), (247), (248), (249), (250), (251), (252), (253), (254), (255), (256), (257), (258), (259), (260), (261), (262), (263), (264), (265), (266), (267), (268), (269), (270), (271), (272), (273), (274), (275), (276), (277), (278), (279), (280), (281), (282), (283), (284), (285), (286), (287), (288), (289), (290), (291), (292), (293), (294), (295), (296), (297), (298), (299), (300), (301), (302), (303), (304), (305), (306), (307), (308), (309), (310), (311), (312), (313), (314), (315), (316), (317), (318), (319), (320), (321), (322), (323), (324), (325), (326), (327), (328), (329), (330), (331), (332), (333), (334), (335), (336), (337), (338), (339), (340), (341), (342), (343), (344), (345), (346), (347), (348), (349), (350), (351), (352), (353), (354), (355), (356), (357), (358), (359), (360), (361), (362), (363), (364), (365), (366), (367), (368), (369), (370), (371), (372), (373), (374), (375), (376), (377), (378), (379), (380), (381), (382), (383), (384), (385), (386), (387), (388), (389), (390), (391), (392), (393), (394), (395), (396), (397), (398), (399), (400), (401), (402), (403), (404), (405), (406), (407), (408), (409), (410), (411), (412), (413), (414), (415), (416), (417), (418), (419), (420), (421), (422), (423), (424), (425), (426), (427), (428), (429), (430), (431), (432), (433), (434), (435), (436), (437), (438), (439), (440), (441), (442), (443), (444), (445), (446), (447), (448), (449), (450), (451), (452), (453), (454), (455), (456), (457), (458), (459), (460), (461), (462), (463), (464), (465), (466), (467), (468), (469), (470), (471), (472), (473), (474), (475), (476), (477), (478), (479), (480), (481), (482), (483), (484), (485), (486), (487), (488), (489), (490), (491), (492), (493), (494), (495), (496), (497), (498), (499), (500), (501), (502), (503), (504), (505), (506), (507), (508), (509), (510), (511), (512), (513), (514), (515), (516), (517), (518), (519), (520), (521), (522), (523), (524), (525), (526), (527), (528), (529), (530), (531), (532), (533), (534), (535), (536), (537), (538), (539), (540), (541), (542), (543), (544), (545), (546), (547), (548), (549), (550), (551), (552), (553), (554), (555), (556), (557), (558), (559), (560), (561), (562), (563), (564), (565), (566), (567), (568), (569), (570), (571), (572), (573), (574), (575), (576), (577), (578), (579), (580), (581), (582), (583), (584), (585), (586), (587), (588), (589), (590), (591), (592), (593), (594), (595), (596), (597), (598), (599), (600), (601), (602), (603), (604), (605), (606), (607), (608), (609), (610), (611), (612), (613), (614), (615), (616), (617), (618), (619), (620), (621), (622), (623), (624), (625), (626), (627), (628), (629), (630), (631), (632), (633), (634), (635), (636), (637), (638), (639), (640), (641), (642), (643), (644), (645), (646), (647), (648), (649), (650), (651), (652), (653), (654), (655), (656), (657), (658), (659), (660), (661), (662), (663), (664), (665), (666), (667), (668), (669), (670), (671), (672), (673), (674), (675), (676), (677), (678), (679), (680), (681), (682), (683), (684), (685), (686), (687), (688), (689), (690), (691), (692), (693), (694), (695), (696), (697), (698), (699), (700), (701), (702), (703), (704), (705), (706), (707), (708), (709), (710), (711), (712), (713), (714), (715), (716), (717), (718), (719), (720), (721), (722), (723), (724), (725), (726), (727), (728), (729), (730), (731), (732), (733), (734), (735), (736), (737), (738), (739), (740), (741), (742), (743), (744), (745), (746), (747), (748), (749), (750), (751), (752), (753), (754), (755), (756), (757), (758), (759), (760), (761), (762), (763), (764), (765), (766), (767), (768), (769), (770), (771), (772), (773), (774), (775), (776), (777), (778), (779), (780), (781), (782), (783), (784), (785), (786), (787), (788), (789), (790), (791), (792), (793), (794), (795), (796), (797), (798), (799), (800), (801), (802), (803), (804), (805), (806), (807), (808), (809), (810), (811), (812), (813), (814), (815), (816), (817), (818), (819), (820), (821), (822), (823), (824), (825), (826), (827), (828), (829), (830), (831), (8

SECRET

Approved For Release 2001/09/04 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001200110001-2

Distribution:

Original - Dr. Sayre Stevens, CIA/DDI
1 - Mr. Leslie Dirks, CIA/DDS&T
1 - Mr. C. Thomas Thorne, Director
 INR/DDR/RAF
1 - Colonel [REDACTED] Executive
 Assistant to Vice Director for
 Production, DIA
1 - OPEI/PAID Subject
1 - OPEI/PAID Chrono

25X1A

25X1A

DCI/IC/OPEI/PAID [REDACTED] x65550 (6May77)

Community on Sub-Saharan Africa

In addition to the collection requirements and resources discussed earlier, the IC Staff conducted a survey of the analytical resources allocated to the Sub-Saharan Africa problem throughout the Community. The objectives of this survey were (1) to inform the planners and managers of NFIB organizations what level of effort currently is underway against Sub-Saharan Africa and (2) to judge whether this level of effort is sufficient to cope with the increase in intelligence information expected from any new or intensified collection effort.

The relatively low level of attention paid to Sub-Saharan African affairs by policymakers from the late 1960s to 1975 was reflected by the slowly decreasing number of analysts and amounts of money spent on collection and production in this area. The situation in Angola, however, signaled a sharp increase in Africa's importance to policymakers and in the requirements for intelligence collection and analysis. The Community has responded to these needs by increasing significantly the priority of intelligence on Sub-Saharan Africa, thereby adding to the workload of an analytical pool which did not grow in size proportionately to the new demands.

The detailed requirements for information discussed previously call for augmented collection in only a few areas. Overall, the IC Staff believes this increased collection will not inundate intelligence analysts with so much information that significant increases in analytic effort would be required.

25X1B Our review of analysis on Sub-Saharan Africa finds that the work load on analysts is in direct proportion to the requirements for finished intelligence levied upon them, not to the amount of information collected. Indeed, even those organizations responsible for the processing of raw intelligence information feel the pinch of limited manpower resources more from the requirements of the analytical shops for support than from processing increased [REDACTED] While it is true that more of an individual's time would be taken up by analyzing additional raw data, the impact of this increase is generally less significant than that of answering additional requests for finished or processed intelligence on Sub-Saharan Africa.

25X1A The IC Staff review of analytical resources indicates that there are approximately [REDACTED] analysts or equivalent manyear analysts presently assigned to Sub-Saharan Africa by Intelligence Community organizations. Not all of these designated

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2001/09/04 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001200110001-2

25X1B
25X1B

positions are filled at this time. Collection manpower resources are not included in these totals. For the most part, however, the figures do include analysts assigned to the processing functions

25X1B

and [REDACTED] work done at [REDACTED] Table 1 records numbers of analysts and equivalent analysts assigned to Sub-Saharan African analysis and reporting. Details are provided in the Tab.

25X1A

25X1A

TABLE 1


25X1A

Analysts Assigned to Sub-Saharan Africa:
Processing and Reporting

Community Component

Full-Time Analysts/
Equivalent Analysts*

25X1A



The IC Staff strongly believes that this number is near the minimum which can be devoted to Sub-Saharan Africa and still provide the substantive intelligence required by policymakers, especially in light of the increased interest in Sub-Saharan affairs displayed by the Carter Administration. There is no "fat" in this total analytical effort. On the other hand, our review also indicates that a major increase in analytical slotting for Sub-Saharan Africa is not warranted at this time. As the patterns of

*An Equivalent Analyst is the estimated full-time input of several part-time analysts.

SECRET

Approved For Release 2001/09/04 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001200110001-2

SECRET

Approved For Release 2001/09/04 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001200110001-2
demand for substantive intelligence support emerge from national and departmental consumers, however, the elements of NFIB agencies responsible for Sub-Saharan Africa may well be able to justify modest increases (1 to 2 analytical positions) to the current numbers. Augmentation of this magnitude to the analytical effort should be left to the individual agencies concerned.

ICS View:

Of the three major production components in Table 1, DIA was most pressed to satisfy the requirements levied upon it for finished intelligence on Sub-Saharan Africa. The African Branch within DIA's Directorate of Intelligence Research (DB) must respond to production tasking from both national and departmental levels. While a major augmentation in this branch's manpower would ease the problem, the IC Staff believes that other measures can be taken which would not require a significant increase in personnel. The Staff recognizes DIA's responsibilities to analyze and report on political-military and economic subjects directly pertinent to DOD's primary missions. We believe that the manpower currently used by DIA in producing general intelligence on such areas as Sub-Saharan Africa transportation/telecommunications, biographics, geography and industrial facilities could better be used to augment those analysts responsible for assessments of military forces and associated facilities and installations--areas where DIA can make unique contributions to national and departmental requirements. The IC Staff believes that other Community elements, e.g., CIA and NPIC, should be relied upon by DIA to provide the intelligence information needed to support its military capabilities efforts. This would alleviate the necessity for a major increase in analytic slots in DB; any minor additions still determined by DIA management to be necessary could then be justified more easily.

25X1B The IC Staff believes the production elements at State and CIA probably can handle the analytical work load at current manpower levels under normal circumstances. During periods of heightened tension or interest, particularly in portions of Sub-Saharan Africa which are not normally in the spotlight, temporary shifts in analytical responsibilities may be necessary. These probably would be at the expense of long-term research and analysis projects. A significant increase in analytical manpower which would alleviate the necessity for short-term shifts in emphasis is not, in the IC Staff's view, justified at this time. If, however, DIA shifts its areas of responsibility to rely on CIA

probably would be justified. The determination of whether, and by how much, to increase the OCR effort against Sub-Saharan Africa should be made by CIA management once the degree of added requirements is established.

SECRET

25X1B

[REDACTED]

section frequently necessitate shifting of analysts from other areas to work on Sub-Saharan Africa, and at times, shifting analysts from Africa to other areas. Longer term, in-depth analyses (Phase III exploitation) often suffer because of the lack of continuity in effort. DIA management should study closely its tasking requirements to see [REDACTED] can provide some of the support now furnished by [REDACTED]. If, after such a review, DIA determines that its departmental requirements must still be satisfied [REDACTED] to Sub-Saharan Africa may be justified.

[REDACTED]

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

SECRET

SECRET


Approved For Release 2001/09/04 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001200110001-2

Allocation of Analytic and Processing
Resources to Sub-Saharan Africa

The following figures represent either the number of analysts working the Sub-Saharan problem on a full-time basis or the number of "equivalent" analysts, i.e., the aggregate of several people who work Sub-Saharan Africa on a part-time basis. (Clerical personnel are not included in the numbers.) One "equivalent" analyst corresponds roughly to one man-year of effort.

The total numbers presented per organization rarely portray the actual level of effort at any given time. Because the numbers are, for the most part, "authorized" levels, some positions may not be filled now or for several months. And, like most intelligence officers, full- and part-time analysts on Sub-Saharan Africa are subject to military duties, training, rotational assignments, and other endeavors which cut down on the total time spent on intelligence analysis.

25X1A



SECRET

Approved For Release 2001/09/04 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001200110001-2

25X1A

Approved For Release 2001/09/04 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001200110001-2

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2001/09/04 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001200110001-2


SECRET

Approved For Release 2001/09/04 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001200110001-2

State/INR--12 analysts.

The Office of Research and Analysis for Africa is responsible for political and economic analysis on Sub-Saharan Africa.

25X1A



SECRET

Approved For Release 2001/09/04 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001200110001-2